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STUDENT DRUG TESTING: THE BLINDING APPEAL OF 
IN LOCO PARENTIS AND THE IMPORTANCE OF STATE 
PROTECTION OF STUDENT PRIVACY 
"Government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or 
for ill, it teaches the whole people by its example. "1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The drug-abuse2 crisis in America has its roots in the 
dissociation of people from each other.:3 For young people, 
dissociating from one's parents and other adults is practically a 
right of passage in modern times, and recent research gives 
credence to what parents have always suspected: there 1s 
something different about the brain of a teenager. 
Parents of teenagers don't have it easy. Door-slamming fights 
over phone use and friend choice, late nights spent lying 
awake envisioning benders or high-speed car chases, the 
futile feeling that everything you says [sic] goes in one ear 
and out the other. And as much as parents struggle, teens 
will attest that adolescence is no cakewalk for them 
either. . . . [I]maging technologies are revealing brain 
differences that could explain teen traits that exasperate 
adults, including impulsivity, poor judgment and social 
anxiety.4 
But regardless of whether the psychological and emotional 
problems of adolescents have social or biological roots, there 
1. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 48fi (1928). 
2. The word drug, as used in this comment, refers to all mind-altering 
substances, including alcohol. 
3. See U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF .Jm:TICE PROGRAMS, PROMISI:-JG 
STRATEGIES TO REDUCE SUBSTANCE ABUSE 1 (2000). auailable at 
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesllojp/18:31fi2.pdf (stating that two decades of research 
have identified "well-developed social skills, strong family bonds, attachment to school, 
and active involvement in the community and religious organizations" as effective 
prevention strategies). 
4. Erika Packard, That Teenar;e Feeling, MONITOR 0:-.1 PSYCIIOL .. Apr. 2007. at 
20, available at http://www.apa.org/monitor/apr07/teenage.html. 
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exists a "war" of sorts between well-intentioned adults and 
teenagers over how far young people can stretch the envelope 
of dangerous recreational drug use, and how far adults will go 
to stop them. 
Because teenagers are normally (and in fact wired to be) 
combative and rebellious, their "army" will never be the one to 
back down. This means the adults in their lives have two 
choices: (1) return fire by never letting their children out of 
sight, constantly searching personal belongings for drugs, and 
even forcing their own children to submit to random drug 
tests,5 or (2) dismantle these intrusive weapons in enlightened 
recognition that a futile drug war with their own children 
merely destroys any possibility of developing a relationship of 
trust and respect. Despite the relative benefits of option two, 
parents often choose to return fire, thus escalating the 
substance abuse "arms race." 
In recent years, the efforts of parents to prevent drug use 
by their children were supplemented and, in far too many 
cases, replaced by school efforts to do the same. In his 2004 
State of the Union address, President Bush stated, "I propose 
an additional 23 million dollars for schools that want to use 
drug testing as a tool to save children's lives. The aim here is 
not to punish children, but to send them this message: We love 
you, and we don't want to lose you."6 A group calling itself the 
National Student Drug Testing Committee has even proposed 
model legislation, encouraging state legislatures to adopt 
statutory language that expressly allows public school districts 
to perform random, suspicionless searches for drugs. 7 Both the 
President and the Committee likely took their lead from recent 
decisions of the United States Supreme Court.s 
5. "So many parents simply haven't thought to drug test their kids at home, 
even though testing is a very effc~ctive means of preventing teen drug use, especially by 
giving kids a great 'excuse' to say, 'NO WAY, MY PARENTS TEST ME."' Drug Test 
Your Teen, http://www.drugtestyourteen.com (advocating and selling home test kits). 
6. Press Rell•ase, l'rPsident George W. Bush, State of the Union Remarks on 
Reducing Dmg Use (Jan. 21, 2004), available at 
http://www. whitehousedrugpolicy. gov/news/press0410 121 04. h tml. 
7. THE NXriO~.\L STUDE:--IT DRUG-TESTJ:--IG COM\11TTEE, MODEL LEGISLATI0:--1 
FOR STCDE:\T DIWC:-TESTJ:\G PROGRAMS (200:3), available at 
http://www.studentdrugtpsting.org/ model%20state%,20bill'lo20web%20file.PDF. 
8. The Committee hegins its sample language for state statutes with, "[I]n 
accordance with the most recent enunciation of constitutional principles by the 
Supreme Court .... " THE NATIONAL STUDENT Drmc:-TESTINC: COMMITTEE, Sample 
Language Inserted into Rxisting State Statute, MODEL LE<:ISLATION FOR STUDENT 
2] STUDENT DRUG TESTING 253 
The trend is dangerous. Random, suspicionless drug testing 
of public school students will distance students from school 
personnel as long as it remains in the school's arsenal. This 
distance is exactly what needs to be bridged. By using random 
student drug testing, schools are missing opportunities to 
redefine their efforts as a realistic movement toward enacting 
change. Instead of saying, "We will help you deal in positive 
ways with the struggles of growing up, and we are willing to 
confront and dismantle the intricate and daunting obstacles 
standing in the way of your healthy development," the use of 
these tests says simply, "We think the only way to help you is 
to catch you in the act, and the best way to catch you is to place 
a drug checkpoint in between you and your participation in the 
most rewarding activities of school."9 
Adults have thus taken a stance that a confused and 
frightened teenager might take. They have chosen to engage in 
brinksmanship with a group they do not want to consider an 
enemy, and with whom they desperately need open lines of 
communication. Of course, that stance is much simpler and 
safer than one involving honest, reflective, and concerted action 
centered on the proposition that there is something wrong with 
teenage and school culture, and perhaps not with individual 
students.lO We know this intuitively, yet the appeal of a 
"blanket" approach, like random drug testing, to the pervasive 
problem of student drug use is rather appealing. It is in fact 
simpler and easier to do scientific analysis on urine than to 
develop meaningful, comprehensive relationships with people 
whose brains are wired to oppose us. Why rely on adult 
intuition when science knows all about our kids, right down to 
Dnu:-T~<:o-;'JT\C (200:3). m·ailahle at 
http://www .stuclen td I'll gtesting.org/model%20state%20bi ll'!·o20web'!o20file. PDF. Timing 
alone suggests that the President was acting on an opportunity opetwd up by the Earls 
decision. handed down only Pighteen months before the Address. The President no 
doubt sought to parlay a socially conservative Court clt>cision into socially conservative 
policv. and ultimately. law, but this is. of course. mere speculation. 
~). For instancP. a 2002 U.S. Supreme Court case upheld drug testing for 
studPnt.s involved in extracurricular activities. See Bel. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. H22 
(2002). 
10. Fell' example. to conduclp that the recent increase in school shootings in 
America is a result of an epidemic of individual young madmen would be improvident. 
This rising violencP indicates an underlying cultural discord among young pc~oplt' that 
is boiling to the surface. Yet. schools, the media, and parents focus their efforts almost 
exclusiwl:-· on iclentifving troubled individuals. ,Just as this approach is unlikely to stop 
school viol<·nce becausp it is n·active and simplistic, blanket drug testing will fail to 
prPn·nt student drug use for the same reasons. 
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the contents of their bodily fluids and the patterns according to 
which their synapses fire?ll What do we have to lose? What 
does our nation have to lose? 
The United States Constitution has something to say about 
all of this. In order to satisfy the Fourth Amendment, a search 
must be reasonable under the circumstances. Ironically, school 
personnel do not have to obtain a warrant or show "probable 
cause" to search students.12 However, courts must be mindful 
that, despite students' diminished right to be secure in their 
persons, "[c]onstitutional provisions for the security of person 
and property are to be liberally construed, and 'it is the duty of 
courts to be watchful for the constitutional rights of the citizen, 
and against any stealthy encroachments thereon."'l:l To say 
that the Supreme Court has carefully considered this warning 
when it comes to searches of public school students would be 
untrue. In fact, the Court has shirked its duty. 
Random, suspicionless searching of the urine of student 
athletes was given the nod of constitutional approval in the 
1995 case Vernonia v. Acton.!4 Then, in the 2002 decision 
Board of Education v. Earls, the right of a school to randomly 
test for drugs in the urine of all students involved in any 
extracurricular activity was upheld.l5 The courts have thus 
spoken on the issue, and the war on drugs lawfully extends to 
the government's collection and scientific inspection of the 
bodily fluids of the hockey-playing, trumpet-blowing, debating, 
cheerleading youth of America. 
These holdings must be viewed for what they are. The 
Court's allowance of school drug testing policies simply defines 
for states and individual school districts what may be done 
without offending the Federal Constitution. These cases say 
little about what must or should be done. Most importantly, 
however, they do little to define what can not be done to 
students. Because the United States Supreme Court has not 
established the boundaries within which school districts are to 
act in the context of suspicionless drug testing, states must 
step forward and affirmatively legislate to define the limits of 
11. See Packard. supm note 4. 
12. New ,Jerse:.· v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. :l2G, :140-41 (1985). 
1 :L Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 2H, :12 (1927) (quoting Boyd v. United States, 
lW U.S. 61G, 635 (1Hill1)). 
l·t. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 4 7J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 64(i (HJ95). 
I;). 5:3G U.S. H22 (2002). 
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these tests to protect each student. 
This Comment illustrates the negative consequences of 
suspicionless student searches, the manner in which the 
Supreme Court has allowed its jurisprudence in this area to 
run amuck, and the critical importance of state law as a 
protector of individual liberties when federal law itself becomes 
unreasonable. Section II investigates the way we view the 
school/student relationship through the lens of a recent case 
involving the show of government force in a public school. 
Section III provides a look at how the Supreme Court has dealt 
with student search cases in recent years. Section IV questions 
the basis on which public school students have been said to 
possess Fourth Amendment rights less significant than those of 
the general public. Finally, Section V suggests that state 
governments play a crucial role in the protection of students' 
personal liberties. 
II. SEARCHING PUBLIC SCHOOL STUDENTS: THE REALITY AND 
THE CONSTITUTION 
On November 5, 2003, at Stratford High School in Goose 
Creek, South Carolina, Principal George McCrackin signaled 
fifteen police officers, who sprung out of their hiding places, 
with guns drawn, into a hallway filled with approximately 130 
high school students. Officers tackled some students to the 
ground and tied several of the students' hands with plastic 
ties.16 Police dogs were brought in to sniff for marijuana in 
students' book bags.17 Guns were pointed at some students' 
heads while officers shouted at all of the students to get down 
on the ground. Hl This nightmarish scenario occurred because 
the principal and local police suspected students of selling 
marijuana out of one of the school's bathrooms.19 The way the 
students of Stratford High School were treated that day is very 
16. Seanna Adcox, State Closes Criminal Case on School Raid, POST & COURIER, 
(Charl('ston, S.C.) .• July 3, 2004, at Al; see also A.J. Angulo & Carol Marchel, On 
Student Rif{hts in the Year of Brown; A Lef{al, Psychological, and Policy Analysis, 2008 
BYU ElllJC. & L .• J. 1. 5; American Civil Liberties Union. South Carolina Students Were 
Terrorized by Police Raid with Guns and Drug Dogs, ACLU Lawsuit Charges. Dec. 15, 
200:3, btt.p://www.aclu.org/drugpolicy/gen/l 0672prs20031215.html (with accompanying 
link to footage of raid from school surveillance cameras) [hereinafter ACLU Lawsuit]. 
17. Angulo & Marchel, supra note 16, at 5. 
1 H. !d. at 5. 7. 27. 
19. !d. at 5-fi. 
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much the way any criminal suspect is treated. They were 
singled out as suspects through government surveillance; a 
comprehensive, decisive, and forceful plan was put in place; 
and finally, the terrified students, most of whom had no 
connection to the marijuana dealing, were subdued by force.20 
No drugs were found.2l 
What did these students expect? After all, there was 
suspected criminal activity happening in the school. However, 
even the Attorney General of South Carolina later 
acknowledged that there was something terribly wrong with 
what happened that day.22 In his words: "Such raid tactics are 
well suited for a crack house but not a school house .... This is 
an example of a good plan in the wrong place."2:1 Parents were 
"absolutely outraged"24 and the local prosecutor had "serious 
concerns about the need for restraining students and drawing 
weapons."25 
One expects the government to act differently around 
schools and students than it does in other places and among 
other people. As the public reaction to the Stratford High 
School incident indicates, one expects government actors to be 
more gentle, careful, and restrained in schools than when 
dealing with common criminals on the street. Yet, in student 
search cases, the Supreme Court has allowed for government 
treatment of students that goes well beyond that which is 
constitutionally tolerated for the average citizen, as evidenced 
by the decisions discussed in this Comment. To get to the heart 
of this peculiarity, two major issues need to be explored: (1) the 
historical and pragmatic relationship between school personnel 
and students; and (2) the type of privacy students can 
reasonably expect in this type of environment. The United 
States Supreme Court has downplayed the privacy 
expectations of students because it has not thoroughly defined, 
m constitutional terms, students' relationships with 
20. See id.: ACLU Lawsuit. supra note 16; see also Angulo & Marchel, supra note 
16, at 6 ("[Principal] McCrackin witnessed this pattern on several st>parate occasions 
and came to the conclusion that a handful of these students wene involved in drug-
related activity." (emphasis added)). 
21. Angulo & Marched. supra note 16, at 5. 
22. Adcox, supra note 16. 
23. Id. 
24. Associated Press, Drug Sweep at School Spurs Prohe. CHI. TRill., Nov. 9. 200:l. 
at §1 [hereinafter Drug Sweep]; see also ACLU Lawsuit, supra note 1 fi. 
25. Drug Sweep, supra note 24. 
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government schools. 
III. EVOLUTION OF FOURTH AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE AS TO 
PUBLIC SCHOOLS 
A. New Jersey v. T.L.O (1985) 
Before the nation's highest court was asked to wrestle with 
the constitutional implications of drug testing in schools, it 
dealt with the basic question of whether, and to what extent, 
public school students were protected from searches by school 
employees. In New Jersey v. T.L.O., the standard constitutional 
requirement that citizens not be searched without probable 
cause or a warrant was found to be inapplicable to a search of a 
public school student by a school administrator.26 The Court 
found that these constitutional safeguards would "unduly 
interfere with the maintenance of the swift and informal 
disciplinary procedures needed in the schools."27 In T.L.O., the 
purse of a high school student suspected of smoking cigarettes 
in the school bathroom was searched by a school administrator, 
who uncovered not only cigarettes, but also marijuana and 
writings indicating the student had been selling marijuana.28 
Creating a new standard to govern student searches by 
school personnel, the Court declared that the legality of a 
search "depend[s] simply on the reasonableness, under all the 
circumstances, of the search."29 Explaining its new standard, 
the Court stated that the "reasonableness" inquiry has two 
parts. First, the search must be "justified at its inception,"30 
meaning there are "reasonable grounds for suspecting" the 
student has violated either the law or a school rule.31 Second, it 
must be "reasonably related in scope to the circumstances 
26. 469 U.S. :125. 340-41 (HlH5). 
27. !d. at 340. Curiously, the Court has not found the work of police officers on 
the streets to be "unduly" burdened hy the constitutional requirements of probable 
cause or the obtaining of a warrant. Are we to assume that catching a student in the 
act of breaking a school rule is more important than catching a criminal in the act of 
committing a felony. so that constitutional protections provided to the latter can be 
justifiably withheld from the former? 
2H. ld. at :32R. 
29. !d. at 341. 
:30. Id. (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1. 20 (196H)). 
:n. ld. at 342. 
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which justified the interference in the first place,":3:z meaning 
"the measures adopted are reasonably related to the objectives 
of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of the age 
and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction.":l:l 
In short, the Court defined a "reasonable search" as one 
that has "reasonable" grounds and is "reasonable" in scope, 
with a "reasonable" relation to the search's objectives.:34 
Considering that the Bill of Rights commands the government 
not to engage in "unreasonable" citizen searches, one wonders 
whether the Court is being admirably loyal to that mandate, or 
if its insistence on a circular definition is a subtle means by 
which to empower school administrators with a liberal amount 
of discretion to search student-citizens, regardless of Fourth 
Amendment precedent. 
Interestingly, and perhaps ironically, the T.L. 0. Court 
thought it necessary to reiterate the protections provided to 
student-citizens by the Constitution, invoking the language of 
West Virginia State Board of Education u. Barnette,:lC> which 
held that students may not be forced to salute the American 
flag: 
The Fourteenth Amendment, as now applied to the States. 
protects the citizen against the State itself and all of its 
creatures-Boards of Education not excepted. These have. of 
course, important, delicate, and highly discretionary 
functions, but none that they may not perform within the 
limits of the Bill of Rights. That they are educating the younf{ 
for citizenship is reason for scrupulous protection of 
Constitutional freedoms of the individual, if we are not to 
strangle the free mind at its source and teach youth to 
discount important principles of our government as mere 
platitudes.36 
T.L.O. is particularly significant in that it marks the first 
time the Court extended the "special needs" doctrine to the 
public school setting.87 The doctrine allows a departure from 
the constitutional requirement of probable cause when, and 
:12. Id. at 341 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 20). 
:3:1. Id. at :342. 
:14. See generally id. at 827-48. 
:JS. :319 U.S. 624 (194::3). 
:lfi. 1'.£.0., 469 U.S at 3:34 (quoting Barnette, 319 U.S. at fi:l7) (emphasis addl'd). 
:n. Robert D. Dodson, Ten Years of Randomizf'd -Jurisprudence: Amending the 
Special Needs Doctrine. fi1 S.C. L. REV. 2SH, 2G:o (Winter 2000). 
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only when, those exceptional circumstances in which "special 
needs. beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make 
the ... probable-cause requirement impracticable."38 In such a 
case, the Court balances the interests of the government 
against the individual's privacy interests to determine the 
reasonableness of the search.:l9 Exactly when the doctrine 
should apply is somewhat unclear, and some have suggested 
that the Court's application of "special needs" is arbitrary.40 
What is clear, however, is that the application of this doctrine 
has opened the door to the erosion of students' constitutional 
rights, as discussed below. In fact, this "unclear, 
unprecedented, and unnecessary departure from generally 
applicable Fourth Amendment standards"41 has allowed 
government actors behind closed schoolhouse doors to invade 
the privacy of students in ways that would not pass 
constitutional muster if inflicted upon the general public. 
Nowhere is this more true than in the area of student drug 
testing. 
B. Vernonia v. Acton (1995) 
In the late 1980s, students in the small logging town of 
Vernonia, Oregon, like many teenagers across the country, 
became noticeably attracted to the "drug culture" and student 
drug use was on the rise.42 Students "boast[ed] that there was 
nothing the school could do about it."43 The students had 
lobbed one over the fence. The administration, "at its wits 
end,"-11 chose to return fire. The Vernonia School District 
instituted a policy requiring all student athletes to submit to 
random drug testing by urinalysis in order to play sports. 4fi If 
:lH. O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 725 (1987) (quoting T.L.O .. 469 U.S. at :351 
(Blackmun, .) .. concurring in judgment)) (alternation in O'Connor). 
:19. !d. 
-10. See, e.g., Linke> v. Northwestern Sch. Corp., 7:34 N.E. 2d 252. 257 (Ind. App. 
2000) ("[T]he drug testing policies reviewed under the special meeds analysis seem to 
gain 'a judicial rubber stamp of approval' even though the justification for the testing is 
not always clear and thl' ineffectiveness of a suspicion based testing regime has not 
been e,.;tablished." (quoting Dodson, supra note :37. at 276)), uacatcd. 763 N.E. 2d 972 
(Ind. 2002). 
41. 1'.L.O .. 469 U.S. at 354 (Brennan, .J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). 
42. Vt>rnonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 511) U.S. 646,648 (1995). 
4:1. !d. 
44. !d. at 649. 
15. !d. at 650. 
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selected for testing, a boy would urinate while in the presence 
of a man who was allowed to watch.46 A selected girl would 
urinate in a stall while a woman listened.47 The samples were 
inspected for tampering and then sent to a laboratory, where 
they underwent scientific testing for the presence of 
amphetamines, cocaine, and marijuana. 4H 
When a case challenging the policy reached the Supreme 
Court, Justice Scalia, writing for a six-Justice majority, first 
found that the privacy expectations of public school students 
were less than those of the general public.49 After all, students 
are routinely required to be tested for hearing problems, dental 
problems, and scoliosis, and must be vaccinated against 
diphtheria, measles, rubella, and polio.50 The Court's apparent 
reasoning is that in light of these accepted public health-
related intrusions, surely students do not have a legitimate 
expectation that additional encroachments on their personal 
privacy and security will be subject to constitutional scrutiny.5l 
Indeed, it is "[f]or their own good."52 
Having peeled away a layer of constitutional protection 
from the whole student body, the Court went on to find that 
"[l]egitimate privacy expectations are even less with regard to 
student athletes."5:3 An "element of 'communal undress' [is] 
inherent in athletic participation", with open locker rooms, 
community showers, and even doorless toilet stalls.54 
Moreover, athletes subject themselves to regulation just by 
signing up for the team. They have to keep their grades up, 
submit to a pre-season physical exam, and comply with the 
coach's rules, among other things.55 "School sports are not for 
the bashful."56 
It seems that the Court found that voluntary nudity in front 
of peers, a minor consequence of athletic participation, 
46. !d. 
47. !d. 
48. !d. 
49. Id. at 657. 
50. Id. at 6fi6. 
51. See id. 
52. !d. 
53. Id. at 657. 
54. Id. (quoting Schaill by Kross v. Tippecanoe County Sch. Corp., 864 F.2d 1309, 
1318 (7th Cir. 1988)). 
55. Id. 
56. See id. 
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constitutes implied consent to being observed during the very 
personal process of urination by an adult who is present only 
for that reason, and whose ultimate purpose is to perform 
scientific tests on the urine to discover if something very major 
is going on in the athlete's private life.57 However, the Court 
cited no precedent to support its conclusion that the voluntary 
and incidental relinquishment of certain privacy expectations 
allows the government to take advantage of that fact to engage 
in further involuntary and deliberate intrusions on its own 
accord. 
Turning to the character of the intrusion, the Court found 
that the manner in which the samples were taken was typical 
of the environment of public restrooms, and therefore the 
privacy interests compromised were "negligible."f>8 The Court 
went on to find that the other part of the intrusion-the 
government's scientific examination of a citizen's bodily 
fluids-is not significant because the urine is tested only for 
drugs and the results given only to a few people.59 The Court's 
dismissive attitude toward the intrusions involved here is 
unsettling. A man using a public restroom does not expect that 
the manner in which he relieves himself and the product 
thereof are matters of great interest and concern to a man 
watching him urinate. Nor does he expect that his urine will be 
scrutinized by scientific analysis or that he will be confronted 
with the results of that analysis and have his life dramatically 
and involuntarily changed if the results offend the government. 
The Court mischaracterized and overtly downplayed both 
intrusions, most likely for two reasons. First, in T.L. 0. the 
Court had set the stage for eroding the Fourth Amendment 
rights of students by putting aside the requirement of probable 
cause to promote the "swift and informal disciplinary 
procedures needed in the schools."60 The constitutional rights 
of students having been overshadowed by practical 
considerations, the Acton Court was free to continue down that 
road. Second, the concept of in loco parentis, the theory that 
schools essentially replace parents during the school day, 
pervades the Court's public school jurisprudence.61 Even 
57. ld. n.t ();)C\. 
58. ld. 
59. ld. 
60. New .Jersey v. 'I'.L.O. 469 U.S. 325, 340 (1985). 
()1. Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2633 n.6 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring) 
262 B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL [2008 
though the Court has been slowly moving away from the 
doctrine, when the Court does choose to invoke it, the idea that 
parents have delegated at least part of their parental powers to 
school personnel-and parents are, of course, free to search 
their children as they please62-cleanly removes much of the 
inconvenient constitutional red tape getting in the way of the 
school's "custodial and tutelary responsibility for children."fi:l 
Significantly, Acton invokes, for the first time in the public 
school context, the "special needs" doctrine to negate the need 
for individualized suspicion in conducting the searches.64 The 
precedent for this allowance lies in cases where public 
employees were randomly tested for drugs.65 In such cases, the 
Court has held that "[i]n limited circumstances, where the 
privacy interests implicated by the search are minimal, and 
where an important governmental interest ... would be placed 
in jeopardy by a requirement of individualized suspicion, a 
search may be reasonable despite the absence of such 
suspicion."66 
An important aspect of those cases allowing for random 
drug searches of public employees is the fact that the 
employees were completely free to seek employment elsewhere; 
they were not forced to submit to the tests any more than they 
were forced to work for the government.67 In contrast, public 
school students are forced to attend school by compulsory 
(stating that ''at least nominally, [the Supreme] Court has continued to rvcognize the 
applicability of the in loco parentis doctrine to public schools"). 
62. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000). 
63. Acton, 515 U.S. at 656. Although the Court has expressly abandoned in loco 
parentis as a model for the relationship between public schools and their studenb, the 
abandonment appears to be entirely semantic. The "special needs" doctritw is not itself 
a model for a relationship, but rather contemplates the identification of a need that is 
unique to the government institution that is being challenged. In this case>. the> need 
cited is the "custodial and tutulary" responsibilities of public school ptersonnel. One 
could argue that such responsibilities have their origin in law, but in fact these 
concepts come from the traditionally parent-like role of schools. If this were not the> 
case, then there would be no "special" need at all. The "special'· charactn of schools 
comes only from the fact that they are asked to do what parents would othnwis<• do on 
their own. 
64. Id. at 65::l. While T.L.O. marks the first time the Court usc>d the "spvcial 
needs" doctrine in the public school setting, Acton is the first time the Court did so in 
order to set aside the requirement of individualized suspicion. 
65. ld. 
66. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602. 624 ( 1989); see also 
Nat'! Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. G56, 679 (Hlf\9). 
67. See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 624-27. 
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schooling laws.fiH Although students are technically not 
required to participate in extracurricular activities, they are 
encouraged to do so to the point where nonparticipation makes 
them outcasts, and harms their social, physical, and mental 
well-being.69 To say that participation in extracurricular 
activities is optional is to ignore their central, critical 
importance to public education. Students are not employees of 
the school, nor are they, in any realistic sense, free to choose 
non-participation in school activities. As such, the application 
of the "special needs" doctrine to justify abandonment of the 
requirement of individualized suspicion in schools is a stretch, 
at best. The reality of the situation is that the drug tests are 
required only of those students who are least likely to use 
drugs. 70 Those who go against the healthy advice of adults and 
do not participate in extracurricular activities will never be 
subject to these intrusive government searches. That is the 
message that is sent, and it is undoubtedly heard by students. 
To allow fundamental constitutional protections to be set 
aside for the sake of convenience, or in deference to the interest 
of government actors charged with quasi-parental action, is 
patently contrary to the Court's own recognition that school 
children do, without any doubt, enjoy the protection of the 
bedrock constitutional guarantees of liberty and privacy: 
"[Y]oung people do not 'shed their constitutional rights' at the 
schoolhouse door."71 
The Court consistently draws a line between necessary and 
practical deference to the quasi-parental role of schools, and 
the inalienable constitutional rights of children: "The authority 
possessed by the State to prescribe and enforce standards of 
conduct in its schools, although concededly very broad, must be 
exercised consistently with constitutional safeguards."72 This is 
a very clear warning that the deference given to schools in 
fiH. See, e.g., Mo. REV. STAT.§ 1(57.0:31 (2007). 
()~J. See Heather Miller, Students Struggle to Balance Cluss, Actiuitics, MH'III<:AN 
DAILY 0NLI0/E, Sept. 20, 1996, http://www.pub.umich.Pdu/daily/199G/,;,·p/09-20-
96/news/ffl.html ("Learning happens outside tlw cla,;sroom just as much as it happpn,; 
insicll'."). 
70. Bd. of Ecluc. v. Earls, 536 U.S. H22, H4:1 (2002) (( ;inslmrg. ,J. dissL·nt in g) 
("Petitioners' policy targets for testing a studpnt population IL·ast likely to lw at ri,;k 
from illicit drugs and their damaging effects."). 
71. (;oss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565,574 (1975) (quotingTinkL•r v. D''s Moines lnd<•p. 
Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 50:l, 50G (1969)). 
72. ld. 
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dealing with students is merely logistical, and cannot be used 
to undermine constitutional rights. Therefore, in student 
search cases, the Court's justification for schools' downplaying 
the constitutional expectations of student-citizens, that schools 
have "special needs," is a violation of the Court's own 
meticulous efforts to separate those schoolhouse powers that 
are logistically convenient from those that can be granted to 
government actors only if constitutional lines are crossed. The 
reasons behind ancillary benefits provided to government child-
caretakers have thus "bled" onto much more fundamental and 
important constitutional territory. 
The unique needs of schools in dispensing discipline, and 
the unique role of school personnel as quasi-parents, do not in 
any way erase the fact that school personnel are state actors. or 
that students are American citizens. Outside of government 
prisons and the military, there are no institutions that place 
American citizens more at the mercy and whim of state actors 
than public schools. The foundation of personal liberty on 
which our nation is built is most likely to crack when the power 
of the government is unleashed on citizens behind closed doors. 
When that power is expanded precisely because the citizens are 
under close government control, the meaning of the 
Constitution has been mangled to the point where it is no 
longer true to either its letter or its spirit. If anything, the 
Court should be especially suspicious of how the constitutional 
guarantee of personal privacy is protected in government 
schools. 
C. Board of Education v. Earls (2002) 
While Acton indicated the Court was getting carried away 
by the traditional relationship between schools and students, 
Board of Education u. Earls73 solidified the status of students 
as subordinate citizens with privacy rights no greater than 
those guaranteed by the grace of their principal. 
High school student Lindsay Earls was a member of 
Tecumseh High School's show choir, marching band, academic 
team, and the National Honor Society.74 Under her school's 
policy, membership in each of these non-athletic activities was 
contingent upon her urinating in a cup while a faculty member 
7:1. G:l(i U.S. 1"22. 
74. !d. at 82fi. 
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listened, and upon the sample testing negative for drugs. 75 She 
sued on Fourth Amendment grounds, arguing that the search 
"must be based at least on some level of individualized 
suspicion."76 Besides the fact that boys were not directly 
watched under the Tecumseh policy, the process of collection 
and analysis was nearly identical to that used in Acton.77 
Writing for a 5-4 majority, ,Justice Thomas extended the 
reasoning and holding of Acton to cover the facts in Earls. The 
Court found that the driving force behind the decision in Acton 
was the "school's custodial responsibility and authority," not 
the fact that athletes, in particular, had a reduced expectation 
of privacy.7H However, the Court also noted that "students who 
participate in competitive extracurricular activities voluntarily 
subject themselves to many of the same intrusions ... as do 
athletes."79 These include possible communal undress and 
additional rules to follow.so Therefore, according to the 
majority, the reasons for upholding athlete drug testing apply 
with equal force to the testing of students involved in any 
extracurricular activity.Sl 
The Court also found support for its holding in the fact that, 
under the policy, the results of a positive test were to be kept 
largely confidential and not used as criminal evidence. 
[T]he Policy clearly requires that the test results be kept in 
confidential files separate from a student's other educational 
records and released to school personnel only on a 'need to 
know' basis .... Moreover, the test results are not turned over 
to any law enforcement authority. Nor do the test results here 
lead to the imposition of discipline or have any academic 
consequences.H2 
This downplaying of the consequences of a positive test is 
both inaccurate and off-point. First, the privacy intrusions at 
issue are the urine collection process and the subsequent 
search of urine for the presence of drugs.H:3 These are discrete 
75. !d. at 826. :-\:32--:J:L 
76. I d. at 829. 
77. !d. at 8:3:2 :J:J. 
78. I d. at 8:n. 
79. I d. 
80. I d. at :-~:32. 
81. !d. 
82. I d. at 8:J:J. 
8:3. I d. at :-\:32. 
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searches, the constitutionality of which must be determined by 
analysis of each search in and of itself.H4 Any constitutional 
right to be free from these intrusions necessarily exists wholly 
apart from any right not to be unduly punished for a positive 
test result: "[T]he central concern of the Fourth Amendment is 
to protect liberty and privacy from arbitrary and oppressive 
interference by government officials."H5 Lindsay Earls brought 
suit on the basis of her Fourth Amendment right to privacy;H6 
she made no allegation of any undue punishment by the 
government. 
Second, despite the Court's urging to the contrary, the 
results of these drug tests have far-reaching and severe 
consequences. The Court asserted that "the only consequence of 
a failed drug test is to limit the student's privilege of 
participating in extracurricular activities."H7 This simplistic 
assessment, while underestimating the critical importance of 
extracurricular activities, also conveniently overlooks the effect 
that a positive test would have on a student's relationship with 
his family, teachers, and friends. Beyond embarrassment, a 
positive drug test result is almost certain to change radically 
the life of the student, whose reputation would thereafter be 
permanently damaged and whose freedoms would be severely 
restricted by the adults in his life. 
There is evidence, even in the isolated case of Lindsay 
Earls, that this "confidentiality" policy was not scrupulously 
honored by the district. 
Lindsay Earls and her parents allege that the School District 
handled personal information collected under the policy 
carelessly, with little regard for its confidentiality. 
Information about students' prescription drug use, they 
assert, was routinely viewed by Lindsay's choir teacher, who 
left files containing the information unlocked and unsealed, 
where others, including students, could see them; and test 
results were given out to all activity sponsors whether or not 
they had a clear "need to know."88 
Therefore, beyond being extraneous to the Fourth 
84. See New .h•l''t'o' v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, :141·-42 (1985) (analyzing initial 
search of stuclent'o purol• oeparately from subsequent search). 
85. United Statl'o v. Ortiz. 422 U.S. 891, 895 (1975). 
86. Earls. :'i:l6 U.S at i:i26-27. 
87. ld. at t·::l:l. 
88. Id. at 848 (Cinoburg, .J., dissenting). 
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Amendment concerns that are at issue, there is significant 
reason to believe, if Lindsay Earls' experience is indicative of 
other schools' behavior, that school districts intend to use test 
results to the fullest extent possible and that other legal rights 
of tested students, including possible violations of FERPA89 
and medical privacy laws, are implicated by the use, and 
misuse, of these test results. 
The majority opinion gives no indication that random, 
suspicionless testing of all enrolled students would be 
unconstitutional. However, it is fairly clear from Justice 
Breyer's concurring opinion that this case would have come out 
the other way if the policy was to test all students. In citing 
reasons that the policy is not overly intrusive, Justice Breyer 
noted that "the testing program avoids subjecting the entire 
school to testing."90 That this fact was likely determinative in 
Earls reveals the Court's unstable stance on the issue. If, by 
the Court's reasoning, keeping kids off drugs is of primary 
importance, and in loco parentis allows a relaxed privacy 
standard, searching all students should be perfectly legitimate. 
Upon reading the Earls opinion, one wonders what 
happened to the "communal undress" factor that was seemingly 
central to Acton's analysis of athlete testing.fll As Justice 
Ginsburg implies in her dissenting opinion,92 the majority had 
to pull a stunt to get around the obvious rationale in Acton that 
the policy was constitutional because it applied to athletes 
only. The Earls majority employs the relatively immaterial 
language in Acton discussing the decreased privacy 
expectations of students as a whole.93 The further explanation 
that, like athletes, participants in other extracurricular 
activities have to follow certain rules, is peculiar considering 
that the Acton Court found "communal undress" and similar 
aspects of athletics to be definitive of the privacy expectation at 
issue in that case.94 
In a dissenting opinion that is simultaneously lucid, 
89. Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act. 20 U.S.C. ~12:l2g (:WOO). The Act 
denies government funding to schools that fail to prot<ect st ucl,·nts' rights to privac\· in 
certain records. including medical records. 
90. Earls. 5:i6 U.S. at il41 (Breyer, .J., concurring). 
91. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47.1 v. Acton. 515 U.S. 646. 6;)7 (19%). 
92. See Earls. fi:l6 U.S. at il45-47 (Ginsburg, .J .. dissPnting). 
93. Id. at s:30<ll (majority opinion). 
94. See Acton, 51;; U.S. at 657. 
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pragmatic, and founded upon bedrock constitutional law, 
Justice Ginsburg states, "The particular testing program 
upheld today is not reasonable; it is capricious, even perverse: 
Petitioners' policy targets for testing a student population least 
likely to be at risk from illicit drugs and their damaging 
effects."9fi This poignant statement reflects the Court's 
traditionally practical and rational character, as reflected in 
the language of Mapp v. Ohio: "There is no war between the 
Constitution and common sense."96 
The foundation of the majority's holding is that 
extracurricular activities are voluntary, and thus participation 
in them is detached from compulsory attendance laws, and 
therefore the students themselves, and not the government, 
subject those who participate in extracurricular activities to 
drug testing)-J7 This rationale, while superficially appealing, 
belies the truly inextricable role "extracurricular" activities 
play in public schools. According to Justice Ginsburg: 
While extracurricular activities are "voluntary" in the sense 
that they are not required for graduation, they are part of the 
school's educational program; for that reason, the 
petitioner ... is justified in expending public resources to 
make them available. Participation in such activities is a key 
component of school life, essential in reality for students 
applying to college, and, for all participants, a significant 
contributor to the breadth and quality of the educational 
experience.HH 
For state governments to force young people to enroll in 
their educational programs, and then force them to trade 
privacy for participation in the best of those programs in the 
name of the public good, is a sly "bait and switch" technique 
that compromises the integrity of government schools. It would 
be more consistent with the "custodial and tutelary"99 role of 
schools to embrace extracurricular participation as an integral 
part of the schooling to which children are required to submit. 
For purposes of the Fourth Amendment, students are in fact 
compelled by government actors to participate m 
extracurricular activities. These activities are not 
95. Earls. ;)::Hi U.S. at H4:l (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
96. 867 U.S. 61:1. 6:17 (1961). 
97. See gcncrully ]~uris. 5:l6 U.S. 822. 
98. ld. at H45 (Ginsburg,.]., dissenting). 
99. Acton. 5Hi U.S. at 656. 
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extracurricular in any real sense. 
Justice Ginsburg further argues that it is absolutely critical 
to any search conducted under "special needs" rationale that a 
special need actually be demonstrated. 1 oo The purported 
"special need" in cases involving random urine tests of students 
is that there is a nationwide school drug problem.lOl It must 
follow, then, that there is no special need, and thus no 
justification for a suspicionless testing, where no drug problem 
has been adequately demonstrated at the school in question. 
The risks of drug abuse are great indeed: ''[D]rug use 
carries a variety of health risks for children, including death 
from overdose."102 "Those risks, however, are present for all 
schoolchildren."l03 It is precisely because of the large scope and 
breadth of the school drug problem that the need to combat it is 
not "special." A problem that affects all of us, from state to 
state and household to household, implicates the constitutional 
principles that govern all of us. It is unnecessary and 
inappropriate to apply a doctrine designed for application in 
unusual circumstances to a patently usual situation. If the 
special needs doctrine is used to justify a school drug testing 
policy, it should be an absolute prerequisite that the school 
district demonstrate the unique severity of the drug culture in 
its school. 
No such demonstration was made in Earls,104 which makes 
it clear that public school administrators who are concerned 
about student drug use can implement random drug testing 
policies even if no drug use in the school is discovered, and 
even if there is little indication of a local drug problem. I();) The 
justification offered by the Court is that there is a "nationwide 
drug epidemic."106 Unfortunately, it appears the Court has 
endorsed a worthless prophylactic at the cost of personal 
privacy for millions of young citizens. The tests do not prevent 
100. lc'urls. ;:;;l(i U.S. at il42-·Ll (Ginsburg, ,J.. dissl'nting). 
101. See, e.g, /d. at 8:34 (majority opinion). 
102 !d. at s:Hi-:\7. 
10:\. ld. at il4~ (Cinsburg, .)., dissenting). 
104. I d. at S4:l (stating that the superintendent ckscribed the clt·ug problem at the 
high school as ''not ... major"). 
lOG. The Tecumseh district's indications of a drug problem included only students 
who "appeared to be• [on] drugs," the finding of marijuana in the parking lot. and 
concl'l'rwd communit:--· members. ld. at 8:34-:lfl (majorit:; opinion). 
HHi. Jd. at i-l:\4. 
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drug use.l07 Catching students in the act of using drugs by 
means of testing whole groups of students is not a useful 
starting point for prevention of drug use: "[T]he strongest 
predictor of student drug use is students' attitudes toward drug 
use and perceptions of peer use."lOR Research has led to the 
conclusion that "a policy [of suspicionless drug testing of high 
school studentsl cannot work in the way it is hoped to and will, 
for many adolescents, interfere with more sound prevention 
and treatment processes."l09 In short, we are dealing with the 
powerful forces of peer pressure, teenage culture, and 
addiction. A litmus test for drug abuse will be met with 
hostility and distrust, and will move teenagers away from, not 
toward, getting meaningful help. 
IV. STANDING IN THE SHOES OF A PARENT 
It is taken for granted that the existence and operation of 
public schools is an essential and inevitable aspect of a 
progressive, technological society.llO But the Supreme Court 
has seemingly led the way toward a public that views public 
schooling not only as an institution to serve these societal 
changes, but as an institution that is actually central to the 
successful development of individual Americans, as people. 
This is particularly apparent in the language of Brown u. 
Board of Education: 
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of 
state and local governments. Compulsory school attendance 
laws and the great expenditures for education both 
demonstrate our recognition of the importance of education to 
our democratic society. It is required in the performance of 
our most basic public responsibilities, even service in the 
107. Gneg Winll't", Stu.dy Finds No Sign that Testing /)ctcrs Students' Drug Use, 
N.Y. TIMES. May 17, ~OO:l. at Al (stating that a large-scale national study found that 
"[rl]rug tf•sting in schools does not deter student drug use any mort> than doing no 
screening at all"). 
108. Drug l'olic:-: Alliance. Federal Drug Testing Study Shows lnuasiue Tests Do 
l'.'ot Deter {,'se. lltw<: POLICY NEWS, Ma~· 20. 2003. 
h ttp:l/www. clrugpol icv .<JI'gin<·ws/OC,_20_03testing.cfm. 
109. Brief for t lw ,\nwrican Academy of Pediatrics. Pt a!. as Amici Curiat> 
Supporting l{pspond<·nts at 1. Earls. 5:36 U.S. 822 (No. 01-:l:)~). 
110. This is tme despite· the fact that the first compulsory public education laws 
were not enactPd until the mid-ninetefmth century in America. lnfoplease.com, State 
Compulsory School Attl•ndancP Laws, http://www.infoplease.comlipa/A0112617.html 
(last visited Apl'. :). ~OOK). 
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armed forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship. 
Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the child to 
cultural values, in preparing him for later professional 
training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his 
environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child may 
reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the 
opportunity of an education. Ill 
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If a visitor from another planet arrived in the United States 
and read this proclamation, he would likely be shocked that 
there exists a government institution with such life-giving, 
nurturing, and guiding power. In fact, he might be able to 
think of only one similar cultural force-that of the 
relationship between parent and child. But is it truly the case 
that schools, and not parents, are what allow us to exercise our 
"'most basic public responsibilities,"ll2 and that any 
"expectations" we may have in life stem not from our families 
or communities, but from our government-run schools? If so, 
one wonders what the role of parents is when the school day is 
over. In loco school, perhaps? 
It is often said that school personnel stand in loco parentis 
to students. 11 :l That is, parents delegate at least part of their 
authority as parents to schools when they drop their children 
off in the morning.114 Oddly, courts have rarely endeavored to 
define exactly what this delegation entails, or which of the 
traditionally "parental" powers are delegated to schools. Courts 
seem satisfied with the proposition that schools get some 
constitutional leeway in their treatment of students because 
they are parent-like.ll5 
However, the Supreme Court has itself questioned the 
model of in loco parentis in a constitutional context: 
Although the early cases viewed the authority of the teacher 
as deriving from the parents, the concept of parental 
delegation has been replaced by the view-more consonant 
111. :14 7 U.S. 4il:l. 49:1 ( 19fi4). 
112. !d. 
11:1. Sec 61:' A\L .ll:ll. :w Schools§ 290 (2008). 
114. Toclcl ,\. DP:\'Iitclwll. The Duty to Protect: Blackstone's Doctrine of In Loco 
Parentis: A Lens for Vie1ring the Sexual Abuse of Students. 2002 BYU EIJUC. & L. J. 17. 
1 R. 
115. Sec, c .. " .. Nt·w .Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. :12fi, :1:1o (191:'5) (recognizing the 
:ohortcomings of the doctrine of in loco parentis and then falling hack on the parent-like 
relationship of schools and students to justify recognition of a lower student privacy 
expectation). 
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with compulsory education laws-that the State itself may 
impose such corporal punishment as is reasonably necessary 
"for the proper education of the child and for the maintenance 
of group discipline."l Hi 
Furthermore, in T.L.O, the Court observed: "Today's public 
school officials do not merely exercise authority voluntarily 
conferred on them by individual parents: rather, they act in 
furtherance of publicly mandated educational and disciplinary 
policies."l17 
If the authority of school personnel over students is derived 
from the state itself, rather than from a delegation of power 
from parents to the government, then that authority is not 
parent-like at all; it was in fact taken from parents. The states, 
through a combination of compulsory attendance laws and in 
loco parentis-inspired policies, have "bootstrapped" themselves 
into possessing a right to infringe on the personal liberties of 
students in a manner similar to a parent. Student-citizens are 
mandated to be in the presence of government actors. and the 
Supreme Court has used this mandated presence to justify 
intrusions on their personal liberties based on the state's own 
declaration that it has such rights. 
Despite the frequent use of the term in loco parentis, there 
are better models for describing the student/school relationship 
and drawing analogies for use in making constitutional 
decisions about the rights of students, for example, that of the 
doctor/patient relationship. The modern approach to public 
schooling is astoundingly diagnostic and treatment-oriented. 
This has been the case for decades, with states requiring 
mandatory testing for academic deficiencies.ll H the federal and 
state governments developing intricate devices for the 
accommodation of physical, psychological, and learning 
disabilities, 119 and perhaps ultimately, with the enactment of 
the No Child Left Behind Act,l20 which conditions the very 
116. Ingraham\'. Wright. 4:l0 U.S. 6iil. 662 (l~l77) (quoting I F. H.\liPI-:Il & F . 
• JAMES, LAW OF TOiri'S ~ :l.:ZO. 292 (1956)). 
117. 469 U.S. at :;:w. 
118. See, e.g. !'v11SSOUIU DEI'.\HniE:--JT OF ELE\IE:\T.\liY & SJ·:('O:\IJ.\IlY EDU'.\TIO:\. 
ASSESS!IIE:\T S'L\:--illc\IWS FOR MISSOL!HI I'll llLJ(' St 'IIOOLS (199H). 
http://www. dese. mo. gov/clivimprove/assess/assessmt•ntst a nda rds. pdf ( outlining the 
requirements of thP mandatory Missouri Assessm,nt Program). 
119. See, e.g. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act. 20 U.S C.~~ 1400-H87 
(2000). 
120. 20 U.S. C. ~~ fi:lO I 6ii7H (Supp. V 2005). 
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existence of a public school on progress measured by empirical 
data developed and collected by strict adherence to statistical 
standards.l21 Two important conclusions can be drawn from 
the state of modern schools. First, this is not "parenting;" it is 
the application of the scientific method. Second, the academic 
progress of a school, as measured by empirical data, is being 
given top priority by school administrations over many other 
considerations.l22 We want our schools to succeed so badly that 
we have commanded them to stop being parents and start 
increasing test scores. Therefore, while in loco parentis is not a 
dead letter, it is a model for schools that has proper application 
only in the minds of Supreme Court Justices. 
The diagnostic character of modern public schools is often 
confirmed by teachers and administrators with first-hand 
knowledge of how schools operate. A recent broadcast on 
National Public Radio about the current emphasis on student 
achievement data included interviews with public school 
teachers in California who spoke in an impressive, analytical 
manner one might expect of a scientist.123 A third-grade 
teacher described his school's data-driven curriculum as 
follows: "It's kind of like a scientific process of shooting a rocket 
off. ... That one didn't work. Let's go back to the drawing 
board. We're going to add better fins, we're going to streamline 
this thing, and we're going to put a parachute on it."124 
Traditional interaction among teachers and the 
administration has taken a backseat to a focus on data and 
exacting pedagogical methods. Schools "are throwing out old 
practices, such as regular staff meetings that did little more 
than take up time. In many schools, teachers only get together 
to discuss student achievement data."125 All of this is, of 
course, driven by the necessity of schools to meet federal 
121. 20 U.S.C. ~ fWJ:l(d) (Supp. V 2005) (describing in detail the thorough 
statistical method for measuring achievement that is mandated by federal law). 
122. See Kansas City. Missouri School District Homepage, 
http://www2.kcmscl.lwt./J>ag·,.s/AboutKCMSD.aspx (last visited Mar. 16, 2008). The 
homepage states: "When• Achievement Is The Standard." The achievement referred to 
is likely not social achi<'V(•nwnt, and it is doubtful that the "standard" is one set by the 
students themsc]v,·s. The District makes it clear that "[tjhe students' performance 
standards arc> a nitical part of the District's efforts to regain full accreditation." Id. 
12:3. Morning Hdition: California Schools Collect Student Data to Help Kids (NPR 
radio broadcast .June> 1 H. 2007) (transcript available at http://www.npr.org/templates/ 
story/story.php'lstoryld=11151 1-\29). 
124. ld. 
125. Id. 
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standards in order to continue to receive federal funding.l26 
Moreover, teachers themselves have a vested interest in the 
school's achievement and progress data, because "many people 
think that poor performing schools have poor teachers."127 
While some teachers, perhaps those with scientific 
backgrounds, actually find the data-driven approach 
"invigorating,"12H others know something is amiss in this 
approach. As one teacher said, "In our minds these aren't little 
data people .... I don't see a score. I see a li.ttle person, who I 
want the very best life for."l29 While this sentiment is likely 
shared by many teachers, raising people is not the task modern 
schools have undertaken. They are on a mission to raise 
numbers, and they cannot afford to fail. This is strikingly 
similar to the way a doctor regards his patients. He is 
singularly concerned with finding out what is wrong, applying 
the best possible techniques, and achieving positive results. 
Because schools regard students as scientific subjects for 
educational purposes, one would be consistent in regarding 
them as such for constitutional purposes as well. 
The Supreme Court addressed the topic of involuntary drug 
testing in state-run hospitals in Ferguson v. City of 
Charleston.l30 In that case, the hospital, without the patients' 
permission, tested the urine of pregnant women who were 
suspected of using cocaine.l:31 The hospital cited its ultimate 
goal of getting pregnant women off drugs and into treatment as 
a substantial justification for the searches.l :32 It asserted that 
the case should be analyzed under the "special needs" 
balancing test.J:'l:l Therefore, as in Acton and Earls, the Court 
was potentially confronted with the question of whether the 
public's interest in keeping a group of vulnerable people off 
126. !d. 
127. Jd. 
12il. !d. 
129. !d. 
1 :lO. fi:32 U.S. G7 (20(ll). 
1 :n. !d. at 70. 
L12. See id. at 82; see also Brief of R<~;;pondents at :l. Ferguson. ii::J2 U.S fi7 (No. 
99-9:lG) (arguing that not only did the hospital have a direct clinical need to know if 
pregnant patients werp using cocaine, hut also had a "broader medical and social need 
to stem the tide of an epidemic of maternal dntg use"). Similarly. schools makP the 
argument that they have a duty to stem th" tide of an epidemic of studPnt drug use. 
See supra text accompanying note 10(). 
J:l:l. Brief of Respondents, supra 1.'32, at 24 (stating that the drug test;; ckarlv met 
"the guiding principle;; and parameters of the special needs doctrine•"). 
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drugs outweighs the individual's Fourth Amendment privacy 
expectations. However, the Court chose not to resort to "special 
needs analysis" in Ferguson, stating that the purpose of the 
tests was "ultimately indistinguishable from the general 
interest in crime control."1:34 Thus, the stated purpose was 
insufficient to overcome "[t]he Fourth Amendment's general 
prohibition against nonconsensual, warrantless, and 
suspicionless searches." 1:35 
The "special need" cited in student search cases, keeping 
kids off drugs for their own good, is almost identical to the 
asserted "special need" the Court rejected in Ferguson, namely, 
keeping pregnant women off drugs for their own good.l:36 
Because the school/student relationship more closely resembles 
the doctor/patient relationship than the parent/child 
relationship, and government-run hospital patients have a 
recognizable privacy expectation in the contents of their bodily 
fluids, government-run school students should be afforded at 
least the same constitutional protections as patients. In short, 
the need to keep students off drugs is not special; it is 
universal, and implicates the full protections of the Fourth 
Amendment. Students are not sub-citizens; they are 
particularly impressionable citizens who do not "shed their 
constitutional rights ... at the schoolhouse gate."1:37 
V. lNTEIU'ItETING STATE LAWS TO PROVIDE PROTECTIONS 
BEYOND THOSE OF FEDERAL LAW 
State constitutions typically contain search and seizure 
clauses that are nearly identical to the language of the Fourth 
Amendment. When a plaintiff sues under both the state and 
federal constitutions, the handling by the state court of the 
state law claim is a delicate balance among longstanding 
principles of federalism, respect for the U.S. Supreme Court, 
and practical considerations. For example, the Iowa Supreme 
Court, in upholding a suspicionless high school locker search, 
1:34. Id. at 81 (quoting Indianapolis v. Edmond. 531 U.S. :l2. 44 (2000)). Unlike the 
policies in Acton and !~uris. under the hospital's policy. if a woman tested positive for 
eucaine twice. the police would be notified and the patient would he arrested. !d. at 72. 
1:'35. ld. at 1-i(i. 
1:36. ld. at i-1·1 (claiming that the hospital's true purpose was to use the threat of 
arrest to "forcP wonwn into treatment"). 
1:37. Tinker v. lks Moines, :HJ:l U.S. 503, 506 (1969). 
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stated, "[W]e usually interpret 'the scope and purpose of [Iowa's 
search and smzure provision) to track with federal 
interpretations of the Fourth Amendment.'"1:3s It does this out 
of "[s]pecial respect and deference [to] United States Supreme 
Court interpretations of similar language in the federal 
constitution." 139 
This rather weighty deference is remarkable. considering a 
state court need not, when interpreting state law, follow U.S. 
Supreme Court decisions that find no violation of the Federal 
Constitution (like Acton and Earls). When interpreting state 
law, a state court is bound only by U.S. Supreme Court 
decisions that define the constitutional limitations on state 
action.l40 A state is free to provide its c1hzens with 
constitutional rights beyond those guaranteed by federal law. 
without need for even passing recognition of what the Federal 
Constitution does not guarantee.l41 Nonetheless, a state court 
will often look to the U.S. Supreme Court for guidance in 
interpreting a state provision nearly identical to the Federal 
Constitution. Thus, the New Jersey Supreme Court, upholding 
an Acton-like testing policy, stated, "Although we are not 
bound by federal decisions when interpreting our State's 
constitution, 'federal decisional law may serve to guide us in 
our resolution of New Jersey issues."'142 Therefore, the Earls 
decision has led some state courts to adopt a simple "us too" 
method of dealing with student search cases, ostensibly 
because the federal Justices are so well-respected. This is not 
guidance; it is a voluntary abandonment by these state courts 
of the principals of federalism that comprise the boundaries 
within which the federal government must act. State litigants 
are entitled to application of their state's law. not just an 
1:1/l. State v .. Jones, 666 N.W.2d 142, 14G (Iowa 200:\) (quoting State v. Bneuer, 577 
N.W.2d 41, 44 (Iowa 199/l)). 
1:39. State v. Davis. 304 N.W.2d 4:32. 4:l4 (Iowa 19Hl) (citing ]{edmond v ]{a:>. 268 
N.W.2d 849, 852 (Iowa 1978)). 
140. U.S. CONST. art. 3, § 2 (stating that the judicial power of th'• federal judiciary 
"shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under t.his Constitution. the 
Laws of the United States. and ... treatiles"). Because the federal govcornnwnt is one of 
enumerated powers. such power therefore does not extend to casl'S arising uncl,•r state 
law and contemplating no federal issue. 
141. See Theodore v. Delaware Valley Sch. Dist., il:ln A.2d 7fi, Hil (Pa. 200:l) ("The 
cases decided under [the Pennsylvania Constitution] have recogniz,·d a strong not ion of 
privacy, which is greater than that of tht- Fourth AmPndmPnt."). 
142. Joye v. Hunterdon Cent. Reg'! High Sch. Bel. of Educ .. H2fi i\.2d 624. fi:):; (1\ .. J. 
2003) (quoting State v. Cooke. 7fil A.2d 92, 99 (N .. J. 2000)). 
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assumption that federal law has them covered. 
One state court of last resort, also looking to the Supreme 
Court for guidance, found it in a Justice's losing argument. In 
her dissenting opinion in Earls, Justice Ginsburg characterized 
the school's policy as "perverse," because it targets for testing 
those students who are least likely to use drugs,143 and 
··s:·nnbolic,"' and thus unconstitutional, because the policy is 
meant primarily to express the school's abhorrence of drug 
use.l44 In Theodore u. Delaware Valley School District, the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court, interpreting a provision of the 
Pennsylvania Constitution substantially similar to the Fourth 
Amendment, 11;; agreed. I ,Hi 
The Pennsylvania high court held that the Delaware Valley 
School District was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law, 
based on the intervening Earls decision, because there were 
pressing questions concerning Pennsylvania's four-part test for 
the legality of school searches. Under the test, the four factors 
that must be balanced are: "(1) the students' privacy interests, 
(2) the nature of the intrusion created by the search, (3) notice, 
and ( 4) 'the overall purpose to be achieved by the search and 
the immediate reasons prompting the decision to conduct the 
actual search."' 1 ·17 This test is derived from the decision in 
Acton, though the two standards are not identical.14H 
Rejecting the notion in Earls that students' privacy rights 
implicated by the tests are trivial, the Pennsylvania court 
found it critical that the school district had offered no reason to 
believe a drug problem actually existed in its schools.149 As a 
further indication that the fourth factor of the test was not met, 
the court quoted Justice Ginsburg's dissent m Earls: 
"Nationwide. students who participate in extracurricular 
activities are significantly less likely to develop substance 
14.'1. Bd. of Educ. v. ]•;a rls, ;);\(j U.S. 822, 84.3 (2002) (Ginsburg, ,J.. dissenting). 
144. hi. at S;).J. 
14;). Article l. ~ K ol' tlw l'c·nnsylvania Constitution neads: "The people shall be 
,;c·cm·c· in their p<·rsons. h"usc·s. papc•rs and possessions from unreasonable searches 
ancl st>izures. and no warmnt to search any place or to sc•izP an:-· person or things shall 
issut· without c!Pscrihing t lwm as nearly as may hP. nor without probable cause. 
supportecl\l\· oath or affirmation subscribed to by the affiant." 
14fi. tl:Ofi A.2d /(i (l'a 200:l). 
147. ld. at SK (qu"ting In 1'1' F.B .. 726 A.2cl 361. 36i'i (Pa. 1999)). 
148. ld. 
H9. lr/. at 90 91. 
278 B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW ,JOURNAL [2008 
abuse problems than are their less-involved peers."l :50 
In an imaginary war, the Pennsylvania school district had 
taken aim at innocent bystanders. It would be naive to assume 
that students did not notice they were not trusted to make 
important choices for themselves. It would be dangerous to 
assume this caused no harm. The culture gap widens and the 
drug war escalates. While the Pennsylvania court's drawing of 
a line between Acton and Earls was constitutionally 
appropriate, more importantly, it recognized that 
"[g]overnment is the potent, omnipresent teacher. For good or 
ill, it teaches the whole people by its example."l:'il The lesson 
taught by suspicionless drug testing is that it is okay to set 
trust aside for the sake of knowledge. 
Similarly, under California law, it appears that random, 
suspicionless drug searches are unconstitutional. The test for 
whether a student search is allowable in California is similar to 
the "reasonable suspicion" test articulated in T.L.0:J;32 "[T]his 
standard requires articulable facts, together with rational 
inferences from those facts, warranting an objectively 
reasonable suspicion that the student or students to be 
searched are violating or have violated a rule, regulation, or 
statute."l53 However, the Supreme Court of California limited 
the potential scope of the standard by stating, "The corollary to 
this rule is that a search of a student by a public school official 
is unlawful if predicated on mere curiosity, rumor, or 
hunch."l54 As to each tested student, it cannot be said that a 
random, suspicionless drug test is based on notably more than 
curiosity or a hunch. The court also made clear that California 
law itself, and not a delegation of parental power, was the basis 
for this standard: "While most [courts] balance the interests of 
the student against in loco parentis responsibilities of school 
officials, we prefer . . . to view these countervailing 
governmental interests as statutorily, rather than common 
law, based."155 
150. I d. at 92 (quoting Bel. of Educ. v. Earls, );)() U.S. 1-'L!L!. 1-'i):l (:2002) (Ginsburg .. J .. 
dissenting)). 
151. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 4:3il. 4Si'i (192S) 
152. New .Jersey v. T.L.O .. 469 U.S. 325, 341-42 (10Hfi). 
153. In re William G., 7ml P.2d 1287, 1295 (Cal. 19Si'i). 
154. I d. at 1 L!96. 
15:). ld. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
While the need to keep Americans, and especially young 
Americans, from abusing dangerous recreational drugs is 
obvious, the need to instill within young people faith in the 
United States Constitution and its foundation of personal 
liberty guarantees is even more profound and critical to the 
identity of our nation. Public school students have no reason to 
trust the liberty guarantees of our Constitution when they are 
not themselves trusted. But besides the fact that random, 
suspicionless drug testing is an unworkable and undesirable 
practice, there is reason to determine that it is also illegal. 
Because the federal government has not done so, the states 
should reaffirm that their most important citizens possess the 
most important rights of citizens. 
Tony LaCroix 
